SUBJECT: Part 303 Wetland Protection of the Natural Resources and Environmental Protection Act (NREPA), 1994 PA 451, as amended.

Petition of Prodo, Inc.
File No. 96-08-0088
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The above captioned matter was the subject of a contested case hearing resulting in the issuance of a Proposal For Decision dated January 7, 1999. In a letter dated January 7, 1999, the Office of Administrative Hearings gave the Parties until February 1, 1999, to file written Exceptions to the Proposal for Decision. The Petitioner has not filed any Exceptions. The Department of Environmental Quality filed its Exceptions on February 1, 1999. The matter is now before the Chief Administrative Law Judge of the Office of Administrative Hearings for a final agency decision pursuant to Executive Order 1995-18 and Delegation Letter No. OAH-324.101 et seq.-01.

This Tribunal has considered the Proposal For Decision, the Department's Exceptions, exhibits, transcripts, pleadings and arguments. Proposed findings and conclusions not addressed in this Final Determination and Order were found to be unsupported by the record or unnecessary in making a final decision in this contested case.

In its Exceptions the Department argues that under §30311(4)(a) the proposed activity is not dependent on being located in the wetland which exists on the subject parcel. However, the Proposal for Decision accurately applies the wetland dependency analysis this Tribunal has consistently utilized. See Appeal of Robert C. Brammer, Sr., File Nos. 88-6-500 & 90-6-159W. Proposal for Decision, page 40. Therefore, the Conclusions of Law in the Proposal for Decision pertaining to wetland dependency is accepted.

The Chief Administrative Law Judge of the Office of Administrative Hearings ADOPTS AND INCORPORATES BY REFERENCE the January 7, 1999 Proposal For Decision including the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law.

THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED:

1. The Proposal For Decision dated January 7, 1999, is adopted by reference and incorporated into this Final Order.

2. The application for a permit for File No. 96-08-0088 is DENIED.

3. The Petitioner shall, at its discretion be issued a permit consistent with what was termed Department Proposals A, B or C. Said permit shall be issued pursuant to the provisions of Part 303, Wetland Protection, of the Natural Resources and Environmental Protection Act, and as such is considered only a state permit.

4. The Office of Administrative Hearings does not retain jurisdiction in this matter

Dated: March 1, 1999

Richard G. Lacasse, Chief
Administrative Law Judge, MDEQ
Office of Administrative Hearings

SUBJECT: Natural Resources and Environmental Protection Act (NREPA), 1994 PA 451, as amended; Part 303, Wetland Protection

Petition of Prodo, Inc.
File No. 96-08-0088

Dated: January 7, 1999
Richard A. Patterson
Administrative Law Judge

This case involves the denial of an application for a permit by Prodo, Inc., a real estate development corporation. The application was for the placement of 7,225 cubic yards of fill in 3.4 acres of wetlands. The application was made pursuant to the provisions of Part 303, Wetland Protection, of Natural Resources and Environmental Protection Act (NREPA), MCL 323.30301 et seq.; MSA 24A.30301, et seq., and the administrative rules.

This contested case hearing was requested by Prodo Inc., under the provisions of Part 303, Wetland Protection, of the NREPA. MCL 324.30301, et seq.; MSA 13A. 30301 et seq. Procedurally, the hearing was conducted pursuant to the Administrative Procedures Act, MCL 24.201 et seq.; MSA 3.560 (101) et seq.

Pursuant to the Property Rights Preservation Act, 1996 PA 101, MCL 24.421, et seq. MSA 24.421, et seq., in formulating this Proposal for Decision the undersigned has reviewed the Takings Assessment Guidelines and considered the issue of whether this government action constitutes a constitutional taking of property.

Prodo, Inc., (Petitioner) is represented by Julie A. Keil, Esq., of Midland, Michigan. The professional staff of the Michigan Department of Environmental Quality (Department) is charged with the day-to-day implementation of Part 303. The Department is represented by Mr. Stephen M. Rideout, Assistant Attorney General.

During the contested case hearing on February 10, 11 and May 18, 1998, the Petitioner presented four (4) witnesses: Mr. Rollin Reineck, Jr., Consultant and principal of Affiliated Researchers; Ms. Madeline Zielinski, Real Estate Agent, Auburn, Michigan; Mr. John Rapanos, President, Prodo, Inc.; and Mr. Larry G. Marshall, MIA, SRPA, ASA, Real Estate Appraiser, Midland, Michigan. The Department presented two (2) witnesses: Mr. Thomas P. Williams, MAI, CRE, Independent Fee Appraiser and Partner in Oetzel-Williams Group; and Ms. Wendy Jo Skory, DEQ, Land and Water Management Division, Senior Wetland Biologist.

The Petitioner introduced five (5) exhibits and the Department introduced seven (7). A list and description of these exhibits is included at the end of this Proposal for Decision.

Pursuant to the agreements reached at the conclusion of the hearing, counsel for both Parties, subsequent to the receipt of a transcript, filed written closing statements and argument together with proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law. There was an inordinate delay for the parties in receiving a transcript resulting in an unusual prolongation of this proceeding. Proposed findings and conclusions not addressed herein were found to be unsupported by the record or unnecessary in reaching a decision in this matter.

At the commencement of the hearing the Parties entered into the following stipulations:

1. The Petitioner is the proper party to bring this action.

2. The Petitioner timely requested a contested case hearing.

3. The Petitioner is the owner of the property at issue.

4. The Petitioner purchased the subject property in 1988 for the price of seventeen thousand five hundred ($17,500) dollars.

5. The subject property consists of approximately 27.7 acres zoned R-1 located in Section 18, Williams Township, Bay County.

6. There exist on the subject property 14.9 acres of wetlands regulated under Part 303.

7. The Petitioner filed an application for a permit on March 27, 1996 with the Department under Part 303. The application for a permit requested authorization to place 7,225 cubic yards of fill material in 3.4 acres of regulated wetland on the subject property to allow for the development of a 27 lot residential subdivision. Petitioner's Exhibit 6.

Mr. Rideout noted, on the record, the application requested a 32 lot subdivision, but was subsequently reduced to 27 lots to accommodate zoning requirements. Therefore, the foregoing stipulation varies from the request in the application. It should also be noted that the proposal was also previously amended to 30 lots to accommodate zoning changes. Petitioner's Exhibit 2.

8. The Department determined the application for a permit was administratively complete on March 27, 1996.

9. The Department denied application for a permit in a letter dated June 21, 1996. Said letter set forth the reasons for the denial.

10. In the denial letter of June 21, 1996, the Department offered two alternatives to the Petitioner regarding the size and location of the proposed subdivision on the property at issue.

11. The Petitioner contends the alternatives offered by the Department are not economically feasible.

12. The Petitioner has offered to place approximately 12.5 acres on the site under a conservation easement.

I find these stipulations are legally correct, and I adopt them as findings. Stipulations entered into by the parties shall be used a evidence at the hearing and are binding. MCL 24.278; MSA 3.560(178); Dana Corporation v Employment Security Commission, 371 Mich 107, 110 (1963).

The property is located in Williams Township, Bay County, Michigan. Bay County has a population of over one hundred thousand (100,000) people. The property is irregular in shape and consists of 27.7 acres, of which 14.9 are wetlands. It has frontage of approximately 330 feet on Keisel Road and 320 feet on Flajole Road. The property is zoned R-1. The anticipated project envisions the development of a twenty seven (27) lot residential subdivision.

Two Department employees, Ms. Wendy Skory and Mr. Robert Zbiciak, went on site on May 20, 1996. During that visit Ms. Skory noted she observed on the site a mature hardwood forest in the southern upland, with a change in vegetation to more of a scrub shrub speckled alder dogwood type of wetland environment to the northerly portion of the parcel. She testified that in this area water was evident in the nature of a number of ponded areas. A similar isolated wetland was found in the northeast corner of the property. However, this wetland was determined to be under 5 acres and not contiguous to an inland lake or stream, and therefore, not regulated under Part 303. Previous to its application, the Petitioner engaged a consultant, Mr. Rollin Reineck, to perform a wetland delineation. Ms. Skory and Mr. Zbiciak did not necessarily agree with that delineation and contacted the consultant to discuss their concerns. As a result, all three met on site and came to an agreement, after which Mr Reineck revised the map accordingly. Exhibit P-2.

In respect to the regulated wetlands on the parcel represented by Exhibit P-2, Ms. Skory prepared a Project Review Report (Exhibit D-7) and testified she determined the Petitioner had not shown the project was wetland dependent or that there was not a feasible and prudent alternative. Further, she found the project would likely cause an unacceptable disruption of the aquatic resources. Ms. Skory stated the basis for this opinion is the wetland serves as a critical habitat, by virtue of the vernal ponds, for certain aquatic species such as frogs, peepers, salamanders, etc. Transcript, February 11, 1998 at page 125. In addition, the wetlands would be utilized by migratory birds, especially warblers, as well as nesting species such as Robins, Red Shouldered Hawk and mammals such as White Tailed Deer. Id. at page 134. She was also of the opinion that the fill would reduce the area available for flood storage which would effect adjacent properties. Id. at page 135. Because of these concerns, the permit was denied by the certified letter signed by Mr. Zbiciak. Exhibit D-8.

Concurrent with the denial of the application, Ms. Skory and Mr. Zbiciak formulated alternatives which they felt lessened the impacts to acceptable levels. Those alternatives, which hereafter will be identified as Department Proposals A and B, were identified in the denial letter (Exhibit D-8) as follows:

A. Construct two separate subdivision areas in the upland portions of the property as shown in attachments 1 and 2. This alterative will allow for approximately 13 lots in the northeast portion of the property and 6 lots in the northwest portion of the property.

B. Utilize upland area as much as possible for the through road between the northeast and northwest portion of the property, as shown in Attachment 3.

In both of the above options an attempt may be made to obtain access of Winslow Drive in order to utilize the uplands in the south section of the property. In either of the possible alternatives, placement of the remaining wetlands into a conservation easement would be acceptable.

The Petitioner, as indicated, has stipulated to the amount of wetlands and does not directly contest the testimony of Ms. Skory as to its attributes and functions. However, it does contend that either of the Department proposals would cause it to lose money, and conversely only the proposed activity will enable the project to be profitable. Therefore, it argues, the alternatives proposed are neither feasible nor prudent. It also contends its offer to place the remainder of the property into a conservation easement sufficiently protects the resource. Ms. Skory did not directly refute the latter contention, except to state that the Department does not consider or accept conservation easements or any form of mitigation or enhancement if there is a feasible and prudent alternative available. Therefore, it is the question of the feasibility and prudence of the Department's alternatives in relation to the proposed activity which is at issue in this case. The analysis of this issue will be made below. As previously stated, the Parties have stipulated to the amount of wetlands on the property and that they are regulated, so those issues need not be addressed.

The statute contains criteria for the review of permit applications and mandates findings be made with regard to each criterion. To that end, §30311(1) provides:

(1) A permit for an activity listed in section 5 shall not be approved unless the department determines that the issuance of a permit is in the public interest, that the permit is necessary to realize the benefits derived from the activity, and that the activity is otherwise lawful.

A determination of whether the project is in the public interest is made by applying criteria discussed in Part 303. I find, as a Matter of Fact, a permit is necessary to engage in the activity requested, and it is otherwise lawful.

(2) In determining whether the activity is in the public interest, the benefit which reasonably may be expected to accrue from the proposal shall be balanced against the reasonably foreseeable detriments of the activity. The decision shall reflect the national and state concern for the protection of natural resources from pollution, impairment and destruction. The following general criteria shall be considered:

(a) The relative extent of the public and private need for the proposed activity.

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Both of the appraisers who testified in this matter, Mr. Thomas P. Williams and Mr. Larry G. Marshall agree the present value of the property is approximately $80,000, an amount significantly in excess of Petitioner's cost basis. The Petitioner argues that regardless of the property's current value, in order to gain a profit sufficient to satisfy its criteria for an adequate return considering costs and risks of investment, it is necessary to develop the site commensurate with its proposal. However, if the Petitioner could sell the property at the profit without further expenditure and risk, it would seem there is no private need other than to possibly maximize its profit. There was no testimony addressing a need for housing in the area, only that the demographics would not support housing in the contemplated price range.

Based on the foregoing, I find, as a Matter of Fact, there is no compelling private or public need for the proposed activity.

(b) The availability of feasible and prudent alternative locations and methods to accomplish the expected benefits from the activity.

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The testimony of Mr. John Rapanos demonstrates the property was purchased approximately 8 years after wetlands regulation was enacted and upon his cursory "drive by" examination of the parcel. Specifically, he testified "it was purchased for me by Jake Allen...It was a good deal. It was 28 acres and you could buy it for $17,500. You know, it was just too good to pass up. I drove by it. I didn't walk on it..." Transcript February 10, 1998, page 140. In addition, Mr. Rapanos professed ignorance of or disregard for the presence of regulated wetlands or the ramifications of regulation:

Q. Do you know if you had the property evaluated for whether there were wetlands in 1988 when you purchased it?

A. No.

Q. Do you feel there were wetlands on the property in 1988 when you purchased it?

A. I didn't even look at it.

Q. Okay. Were you familiar with wetland and wetland topography in 1988?

A. I wasn't familiar with wetlands, period, in 1988.

Q. In 1988 you had very little familiarity with wetlands issues?

A. No.

Transcript February 10, 1998, page 102.

It is also evident that the presence of wetlands was not discovered until application for building permits were made to Williams Township in approximately 1995. Transcript February 10, 1998 at page 103.

Mr. Thomas P. Williams, an appraiser who testified for the Department, determined the market value of the property as it existed on January 15, 1998, as $80,000. The Petitioner paid $17,500 for the property in 1988 and, to the date of hearing, paid $5,508 in taxes and assessments. Department Exhibits D-1 and D-2. Therefore, exclusive of other costs of pursuing development and this action, Petitioner's direct cost is approximately $23,000. This figure does consider the cost of loss of the use of the money invested or expenses of re-zoning, engineering and proceeding with this contested case hearing, which Mr. Rapanos estimated to be approximately $80,000. The Department argues, on these facts, that Petitioner has made a potential profit on the land of some $57,000 by doing no more that holding it for a ten year period. While this argument disregards the indirect costs of attempting development and credits Petitioner with the outlay for taxes and assessments paid, it is evident Petitioner could at least break even at this point by selling the parcel.

Mr. Larry G. Marshall, an appraiser who testified for the Petitioner, estimated the market value of the property as of January 15, 1998, at $78,000. However, he performed an appraisal which differs from that utilized by Mr. Williams to determine the investment value, a term he defined as the specific value of an investment to a particular investor on individual investment requirements. Having established development and sales costs, and projecting revenue of an average approximation of $30,000 per lot factored on a sales to completion in four years, the Petitioner's proposal would produce, according to Mr. Marshall, an investment value of $270,000.

The foregoing analysis is necessary to place into context the discussion on the feasibility and prudence of the alternatives. In that same regard it is noted that utilizing the upland on the south of the property for development is not prudent because the road right of way is too narrow to accommodate Township requirements. Therefore, the existing road could only serve as a driveway for a single residence.

In addition to the two proposals (A and B) addressed in the denial letter, the Department offered a third which is depicted in Petitioner's Exhibit 7 entitled "Alternative C-19 Lots".

To summarize the alternative proposals presented, are:

1. The Petitioner's existing proposal to create 27 lots involving filling of 3.2 acres of wetland with 6,880 cubic yards of fill. To mitigate the fill a conservation easement would be granted.

2. Department Proposal A involving separate developments of 13 and 6 lots. Eliminate the through roadway and provide access to each site from the north and east. This proposal would serve to eliminate the majority of the wetland fill.

3. Department Proposal B involving development of 17 lots. A through roadway connecting the north and east, utilizing the upland to the extent possible, but eliminating the lots proposed to the south to the roadway in the center of the project.

4. Department Proposal C, which is a variation of Proposal B with the addition of two lots by altering the lot dimensions.

Any of the three Department Proposals are feasible in the sense they can be physically accomplished, the Petitioner's argument against them are their prudence. The Petitioner asserts that if they are unprofitable it would be imprudent to pursue them. However, in order to show an alternative is not feasible or prudent unusual factors or costs of an extraordinary magnitude must be demonstrated. Wayne County Health Department v. Olsonite Corp., 79 Mich App 668; 263 NW2d 778 (1977).

Department Proposal A would result in a lesser amount of fill and consequently a reduced wetland impact. Specifically, it eliminates a roadway running from the northerly border of the property to the south and east, eventually connecting Keisel and Flajole Roads on the easterly border of the parcel. It would also eliminate 9 lots in the center of the parcel. Department Proposal B provides essentially the same number of lots as Proposal A, but with a through road utilizing existing upland to the greatest extent possible. Proposal C is similar to B with two additional lots.

Mr. Rapanos analyzed these proposals as well as other two lessor projects of 13 and 14 lots. The summary of these analyses was entered as Petitioner's Exhibits 9, 10 and 11. In summary, according to the Petitioner's analysis only the 27 lot proposal would generate a sufficient profit, which Mr. Rapanos estimated to be $181,602. He claims any other proposal explored would result in a loss. For instance, the proposal comprised of 19 lots would result in a loss of $123,121. Thus, in that many of the fixed costs of providing water, sewer and utilities would not decrease incrementally with a reduction of building sites, nothing less that the activity proposed in the application would work economically according to Mr. Rapanos.

Even if deference is given to Petitioner's basic purpose, in evaluating alternatives reasonable additional expenses can not be considered a reason to avoid an alternative location or method. The deference to Petitioner's purpose does not translate to profit maximizing alternatives, but rather economically feasible alternatives. Louisiana Wildlife Federation v. York, 761 F 2d 1044 (1985).

Department Proposals A, B or C would provide the Petitioner an opportunity to develop the property while minimizing the wetland impact. While none of them would result in the profit desired by Petitioner, the property was purchased with the regulated wetlands present and all of the other zoning limitations and practical difficulties testified to in place. In essence none of these factors have changed since the date of purchase. Therefore, the Petitioner should expect no more than a fair balance of its desires and reasonable regulation. The Department proposals strike the balance, and I find, as a Matter of Fact, that each constitute a feasible and prudent alternative to the Petitioner's proposal.

(c) The extent and permanence of the beneficial or detrimental effects which the proposed activity may have on the public and private uses to which the area is suited, including the benefits the wetland provides.

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Ms. Skory's testimony and the substance of the denial letter as to the wetland functions were not rebutted. Filling to the extent proposed by the Petitioner would substantially and adversely effect the wetland functions enumerated under this criteria. The Petitioner's proposal to enter into a conservation easement on the property was not seriously explored by the Department because it determined feasible and prudent alternatives were available. AACS 1998, R 281.925(3). The conservation easement obviously would create no new wetlands, nor would it enhance those wetlands remaining on site. In addition, a large portion of the proposed conservation easement consists of upland, thus diminishing the efficacy of the proposal.

There is no public use of the property and, therefore, that factor is not applicable. Private use of the property would be enhanced by Petitioner's proposal and, to a lessor extent, the Department proposals. I find, as a Matter of Fact, the Petitioner's proposal would permanently and detrimentally effect the benefits the wetlands provide. I further find, as a Matter of Fact, the Department's proposals would impact the wetlands to a much lessor extent and would allow Petitioner a reasonable use of the property to which the area is suited.

(d) The probable impact of each proposal in relation to the cumulative effect created by other existing and anticipated activities in the watershed.

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This consideration was not addressed on the record and, therefore, no finding can be made.

(e) The probable impact on recognized historic, cultural, scenic, ecological or recreational values and on the public health or fish or wildlife.

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There was no contention that recognized historic, cultural or recreational values would be in any way effected under any of the proposals. Nor was any adverse impact on public health alleged. Scenic considerations are necessarily subjective and judgmental. Ecological impacts and impacts on wildlife have been previously addressed. Because there are no fish on site, that consideration is not applicable.

(f) The size of the wetland being considered.

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The site contains 14.9 acres of regulated wetland, of which the Petitioner applied to fill 3.4 acres.

(g) The amount of remaining wetland in the general area.

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Remaining wetlands in the general area other than the subject site were not addressed in this record. If Petitioner is allowed to fill to the extent applied for, 11.5 acres of wetland would remain on the site. On addition, there is an area of unregulated wetland in the northeastern portion of the parcel.

(h) Proximity to any waterway.

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The wetland involved is not proximate to any waterway.

(i) Economic value, both public and private, of the proposed land change to the general area.

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The private value to Petitioner would be the generation of income and profit on its investment. Tradespeople, sales agents and others involved would receive a benefit of income. Williams Township would increase its tax base substantially and would, assumedly, receive taxes in excess of the costs of additional services.

(3) In considering a permit application, the department shall give serious consideration to findings of necessity for the proposed activity which have been made by other state agencies.

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There have been no findings by other state agencies.

(4) A permit shall not be issued unless it is shown that an unacceptable disruption will not result to the aquatic resources. In determining whether a disruption to the aquatic resources is unacceptable, the criteria set forth in section 3 and subsection (2) shall be considered. A permit shall not be issued unless the applicant also shows either of the following:

(a) The proposed activity is primarily dependent upon being located in the wetland.

(b) A feasible and prudent alternative does not exist.

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I find, as a Matter of Fact, the activity proposed by the Petitioner, and to a lesser extent the Department's Proposals, are dependent upon being located in the wetland on site at least partially.

I have previously found that Department Proposal A, B or C all constitute a feasible and prudent alternative location and method on site. Therefore, feasible and prudent on-site alternatives do, in fact, exist. There was no testimony as to other feasible and prudent locations other than on the subject site.

1. I conclude, as a Matter of Law, based on the Stipulation of the Parties, the subject site is comprised of regulated wetland and a permit is required pursuant to Section 30304(a) and (b) of Part 303.

2. I conclude, as a Matter of Law, based on the Stipulation of the Parties, the processing of the application for a permit was procedurally correct and that Prodo, Inc., is both the proper applicant for a permit and the proper Petitioner in this contested case.

3. I conclude, as a Matter of Law, the activity proposed by the Petitioner is not in the public interest.

4. I conclude, as a Matter of Law, the activity proposed by the Petitioner will cause an unacceptable disruption to aquatic resources.

5. I conclude, as a Matter of Law, the activity proposed by the Petitioner, and the alternatives advanced by the Department are dependent on being located in the wetland at issue in this contested case.

6. I conclude, as a Matter of Law, the proposed activity is otherwise lawful.

7. I conclude, as a Matter of Law, that Department Proposals A, B or C each constitute a feasible and prudent alternative location and method to the Petitioner's proposed activity.

8. I conclude, as a Matter of Law, mitigation cannot be considered if a feasible and prudent alternative exists. AACS 1998, R 281.925(3).

Based upon the above Findings of Fact and Conclusion of Law, it is proposed that a Final Order be entered denying the application for a permit filed by Prodo Inc., made under File No. 96-08-0088. It is further proposed the Final Order allow for the issuance of a permit consistent with either Department Proposal A or B or C, those having been found to be feasible and prudent alternatives.

Dated: January 7, 1999

Richard A. Patterson
Administrative Law Judge

SUBJECT: Part 303 Wetland Protection of the Natural Resources and Environmental Protection Act (NREPA), 1994 PA 451, as amended.
Petition of Prodo, Inc.

File No. 96-08-0088

1 Statement of Qualifications of Rollin Reineck.
2 Coreboard, entitled, "Petitioner Original Proposal-30 lots".
3 Drawing by Affiliated Researchers, 24" x 36", Received in the Department of Environmental Quality, Land & Water Management Division (LWMD) on March 27, 1996.
4 Coreboard, entitled, "DEQ Alternative A-13 plus 6 lots".
5 Coreboard, entitled, "DEQ Alternative B-17 lots".
6 Coreboard, entitled, "Petitioner Alternative-27 lots".
7 Coreboard, entitled, "DEQ Alternative C-19 lots".
8 Coreboard, entitled, "Assessor's Plat-Williams Township".
9 Five sheets, 8½" x 11", Titled: Alternative 1-13 Lot Subdivision; Alternative 2-14 Lot Subdivision; Alternative 3-27 Lot Subdivision; Alternative 4-19 Lot Subdivision and Connection Fees-Williams Township.
10 Six sheets, 8½" x 11", Titled: Carrying Costs-19 Lot Subdivision, 13 Lots Plus 6; Carrying Costs-14 Lot Subdivision; Carrying Costs-13 Lot Subdivision; Carrying Costs-27 Lot Subdivision; Carrying Costs-19 Lot Subdivision and Carrying Costs-17 Lot Subdivision.
11 Six sheets, 8½" x 11", Titled: Alternative 17 Lot Subdivision; Alternative 1-13 Lots Plus 6 Subdivision; Alternative 4-19 Lot Subdivision; Alternative 3-27 Lot Subdivision; Alternative 2-14 Lot Subdivision and Alternative 1-13 Lot Subdivision.
14 Appraisal of the Prodo, Inc. holdings located in Section 18, T 14 N, R 3 E, Township of Williams, County of Bay, State of Michigan by Larry G. Marshall & Associates, Real Estate Appraiser, Consultant.
D-1 Copies of State of Michigan - County of Bay, 1997 Winter Tax -Township of Williams. Property Assessed to: Prodo, Inc. Beginning with 1997 Winter Tax back to Summer Taxes 1988.
D-2 Two Memorandums, Bay County Treasurer's Office and Bay County Assessment File Inquiry dated 01/22/98, Owner: Prodo, Inc.
D-3 Resume, Thomas P. Williams, MAI, CRE.
D-4 Complete Appraisal of 27.72 acres vacant land by The Oetzel-Williams Gorup, Real Property Appraisers & Counselors.
D-6 Copy of letter, with attachments, dated March 12, 1996 from Rollin C. Reineck, Jr., Director, Affiliated Researchers to Permit Consolidation Unit, LWMD.
D-7 Project Review Report dated May 20, 1996, Michigan Department of Natural Resources, LWMD on application number 96-8-88.
D-8 Copy of letter, with attachments, dated June 21, 1996 from Robert P. Zbiciak, District 8 Supervisor, LWMD, Saginaw Bay District to Prodo, Inc.