STATE OF MICHIGAN
DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY
OFFICE OF ADMINISTRATIVE HEARINGS
_________________________________________________________________
SUBJECT: Part 301, Inland Lakes and Streams of the Natural Resources and Environmental Protection Act (NREPA), 1994 PA 451, as amended.
Petition of Robert W. Ferguson
File No. 97-10-0022
___________________________________________________________________
FINAL DETERMINATION AND ORDER
The above captioned matter was the subject of a contested case hearing resulting in the issuance of a
Proposal For Decision dated May 1, 1998. In a letter dated May 1, 1998, the Office of Administrative
Hearings gave the Parties to May 22, 1998, to file written Exceptions to the Proposal for Decision.
Pursuant to the Petitioner's request, that date was extended to June 12, 1998. The Petitioner's
Exceptions, which contain both legal and factual arguments, were filed by counsel on June 11, 1998.
The Department of Environmental Quality (Department) filed a letter on May 22, 1998 stating it did not
have any exceptions to the Proposal for Decision, but noted a modified permit consistent with the
Proposal for Decision had earlier been issued and is still in effect. On June 15, 1998, the Department
filed a letter addressing the points raised in the Petitioner's Exceptions.
The matter is now before the Chief Administrative Law Judge of the Office of Administrative Hearings
for a final agency decision pursuant to Executive Order 1995-18 and Delegation Letter No.
OAH-324.101 et seq.-01.
This Tribunal has considered the Proposal For Decision, the Petitioner's Exceptions, the Department's
response to same, exhibits, pleadings and arguments. Proposed findings and conclusions not addressed
in this Final Determination and Order were found to be unsupported by the record or unnecessary in
making a final decision in this contested case.
PETITIONER'S LEGAL ARGUMENTS
The first legal argument asserts that the activity applied for meets all of the criteria of Section 30106 of
Part 301, specifically the public trust and riparian rights provisions. Following the Petitioner's
reasoning, the activity must be approved once a finding that the public trust and riparian rights will not
be adversely affected. However, this argument ignores the fact there are additional criteria in Section
30106 which must be addressed before a permit can be issued. The pertinent criteria in this case is the
use of the water by fish. The Proposal for Decision found the loss of shallow water fish habitat is
minimized by the activity allowed in the modified permit.
The Petitioner's second legal argument is that the activity in the application qualifies under Section
30105(6) as a minor project, and therefore, 1985 AACS, R 281.814 (Rule 4) does not apply. The
Petitioner argues that by its nature a minor project activity constitutes a de minimis environmental
impact and the assessment provided for under Rule 4 in not required. In support of this argument
Petitioner notes this Tribunal's Opinion and Order in the Petitions of Charles Patton and Logan Schlipf,
File Nos. 97-6-330 and 97-6-331 (1998). However, that case involved an application for a permit under
Part 325, Great Lakes Submerged Lands, of the NREPA and the analysis in the Opinion and Order was
made on the language of that statute and its rules. Drawing an analogy to that case with the issues
presented by the application for permit made under Part 301 is improper.
Section 30105(6) defines minor project activities as those which have minimal adverse environmental
impact and waives the notice and final inspection provisions of the statute for such activities. Notably,
Section 30105(6) explicitly states that all other statutory provisions are applicable except those
previously noted. Along the same lines, Rule 4 does not distinguish between major and minor permit
activities, but rather mandates in each application a determination of existing and potential adverse
environmental effects posed by the proposed activity.
This Tribunal has consistently held that Rule 4 is inapplicable if there are either de minimis or no
adverse environmental impacts, as opposed to a minimal adverse environmental impact as applicable to
proposed minor activities. See: Petition of Alice Horning and Arnold Nicolay, File 89-13-12 (1992);
Petition of Joseph Milani, Jr., File No. 86-12-257 (1989). In conjunction with this interpretation, when
the Parties stipulate that an activity poses no environmental harm, this Tribunal has held that Rule 4 is
inapplicable. See: Petition of James Schenden, File No, 94-10-733 (1998); Petition of Harold Kreeger,
File No. 90-9-409 (1994). Based on the foregoing, the determination in the Proposal for Decision
regarding the applicability of Rule 4 is proper.
The Petitioner's third legal argument is whether the term aesthetics, as it is used in Section 30106,
pertains to the water or the proposed structure. Section 30106 prefaces the criteria to be examined with
the language "...uses of all such waters, including uses for...aesthetics." From that language, it is clear
that Section 30106 requires an examination of specific criteria as they pertain to the water itself and not
the property or activity. See: Horning Supra. Therefore, the Proposal for Decision is accurate in the
analysis of the effects of the proposed activity on specific criteria as they pertain to the St. Clair River.
PETITIONER'S FACTUAL ARGUMENTS
The Petitioner's factual arguments contend the Administrative Law Judge erred in the following regards:
1) In not determining the proposed activity is relatively small in both size and impact when compared
with the activity allowed in the modified proposal.
2) The Department's modified proposal would result in a substantial reduction in the loss of open water
as opposed to the Petitioner's proposal.
3) The Department's modified proposal is a feasible and prudent alternative to the proposed activity.
These arguments pertain to factual findings made by the Administrative Law Judge who heard the
testimony, the findings will not be disturbed unless they are not supported by the record or result in a
clearly unjust decision. In considering the record in this case, the factually based Exceptions, if true, do
not reach either level. Specifically, the arguments do not affect the finding that the Petitioner is not
entitled to the permit for which he applied due to the existence of a feasible and prudent alternative.
As to the feasibility and prudence of the activity allowed under the modified permit, it is noted that in
the application for a permit the Petitioner stated the proposed activity is intended to "...protect from
erosion". Exhibit R-1. The modified permit will achieve this result while at the same time ensuring
that the activity minimizes all impacts to the water and other natural resources.
The Chief Administrative Law Judge of the Office of Administrative Hearings ADOPTS AND
INCORPORATES BY REFERENCE the Proposal For Decision including the Findings of Fact and
Conclusions of Law.
THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED:
1. The Proposal For Decision dated May 1, 1998, is adopted by reference and incorporated into this
Final Order.
2. The application for a permit for File No. 97-10-0022 is DENIED.
3. The Petitioner is entitled to, and has been issued, a modified permit which allows for the
construction of a seawall which follows the existing shoreline.
4. The Office of Administrative Hearings does not retain jurisdiction in this matter
Dated: June 24, 1998 ________________________________
Richard G. Lacasse
Chief Administrative Law Judge
STATE OF MICHIGAN
DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY
OFFICE OF ADMINISTRATIVE HEARINGS
SUBJECT: Part 301, Inland Lakes and Streams, of the Natural Resources and Environmental
Protection Act (NREPA), 1994 PA 451, as amended.
Petition of Robert Ferguson
File No. 97-10-22
PROPOSAL FOR DECISION
May 1, 1998 Richard A. Patterson
Administrative Law Judge
This contested case involves the denial of an application for a permit to construct a steel sea wall 60
feet in length as depicted in the application for permit (Exhibit P-1, page 5). The proposed project
further anticipated filling behind the sea wall with approximately twenty eight cubic yards of clean fill.
There is no dispute that the proposed project qualifies as a minor project category under 1985 AACS, R
281.814.
JURISDICTION
The application for a permit, filed January 8, 1997, was denied under the provisions of Part 301, Inland Lakes and Streams, of the Natural Resources and Environmental Protection Act. Mr. Robert W. Ferguson requested a hearing pursuant to Part 301. A hearing was held in this matter on February 3, 1998.
The contested case hearing was conducted pursuant to Part 301 of the Natural Resources and
Environmental Protection Act (NREPA), 1994 PA 451, as amended; MCL 324.30101 et seq.; MSA
13A.30101 et seq., and the Administrative Rules promulgated thereunder. The hearing was governed
by the Administrative Procedures Act, 1969 PA 306, as amended; MCL 24.201 et seq.; MSA 3.560
(101) et seq.
PARTIES
Mr. Robert Ferguson is the applicant for a permit and is the Petitioner in this case. The Petitioner is
represented by William R. Lievense, Esq. Testifying for the Petitioner during the hearing were Mr.
Robert Ferguson, Mrs. Sharron Ferguson and Mr. Fred Gottschalk, MDEQ, Contested Case Supervisor,
Land and Water Management Division.
The professional staff of the Department of Environmental Quality (Department) is charged with the
day-to-day implementation of the Part 301 and is the Respondent in this case. The Department is
represented by Mr. Gary Marx, District Supervisor, Land and Water Management Division, Shiawassee
District Office. The Department presented the testimony of Mr. Thomas Kolhoff, Land and Water
Management Analyst, Shiawassee District Office.
There were 30 exhibits entered into the record. A list and description of those exhibits is attached to
this Proposal for Decision.
Pursuant to the agreements reached at the conclusion of the hearing, counsel for the Petitioner filed a
written closing statement and argument together with proposed findings of fact on March 16, 1998.
The Department, in the person of Mr. Marx, responded to that submittal on March 23, 1998. Proposed
findings and conclusions not addressed herein were found to be unsupported by the record or
unnecessary in reaching a decision in this matter.
STIPULATIONS ON THE RECORD
During the pre-hearing conference on December 1, 1997, the Parties entered into the following factual
stipulations:
1) The Petitioner is the proper applicant for a permit.
2) The processing of the application was procedurally correct.
3) The activity proposed in the permit application is a regulated activity, a permit is necessary and the
Department has jurisdiction.
Stipulations of fact entered into by the Parties shall be used as evidence at the hearing and are binding.
MCL 24.278; MSA 3.560(178); Dana Corporation v Employment Security Commission, 371 Mich 107,
110 (1963). Therefore, I conclude, as a Matter of Law, that pursuant to the factual stipulations of the
Parties, the Department has jurisdiction over the proposed activity and the criteria of Part 301 must be
met before a permit is issued.
FINDINGS OF FACT
The Petitioner and his wife are the owners of a residence located at 2799 River Road, Marysville,
Michigan. They also own an adjacent vacant lot to the south of the residence. Both lots front the St.
Clair River. The Petitioner applied for a permit to place a steel sea wall 60 feet in length across the
front of the vacant lot. It was anticipated that the sea wall would be installed in a straight north-south
line, which would necessitate a return wall 15 feet long at the south. Twenty eight cubic yards of fill
would be placed behind the sea wall. The avowed purpose of the sea wall is to reclaim shoreland lost to
erosion, which the Petitioner contends has been exacerbated recently by increased commercial shipping
and the installation of a sea wall fronting the property to the south.
The Application for Permit was received by the Department on January 8, 1997. (Exhibit R-1) In
response to the application, Mr. Thomas Kolhoff went on site on February 13, 1997, and prepared a
Project Review Report. (Exhibit R-5) In that document, under the notes and comments section he indicated:
Site is unprotected eroded shoreline located between two seawalled properties. Lot to the north (same
owner) upstream extends 55' waterward of proposed seawall. Adjacent south is approx. 12-14'
landward of proposed seawall. Adjacent south wall is more or less in line w/ adjacent seawalls that
extend to south. 14 feet of woodwall appears to have been placed recently w/o permit. Property
shoreline presently angles landward to south wall. As proposed, wall would create a new unreasonable
90 degree angle and extend 12-14' waterward of OHWM/shoreline into shallow water sandy/gravel
bottom river habitat. Recommend wall to follow existing shoreline and connect to south seawall.
Pursuant to the foregoing assessment, Mr. Kolhoff offered the Petitioner a modified permit. The
modified permit allowed the installation of a sea wall with the requirement that it follow the existing
shoreline and connect with the sea wall to the south. The modified permit also allowed a reduced
amount of fill, specifically 10 cubic yards. (Exhibit R-7).
It is the Petitioner's position that the proposed sea wall is intended to merely reclaim land lost to
erosion. The Petitioner contends the proposed sea wall would not interfere with the flow of the river, as
the return wall would be downstream and the sea wall would be landward of his boat hoist and his
existing sea wall to the immediate north. Due to set back restrictions imposed by the City of
Marysville, the Petitioner contends that the project is necessary to reclaim the land lost in order to build
on the parcel.
Both Mr. and Mrs. Ferguson testified the erosion has increased over the last year. They attribute this to
increased boat traffic and the installation of a sea wall by their neighbor to the immediate south. A
number of photographs were introduced which demonstrate substantial erosion of the shoreline.
However, aerial photographs introduced as part of Mr. Kolhoff's testimony indicate a substantial
angling of the land inward from north to south dating back to a least 1984.
In contrast to Petitioner's testimony, Mr. Kolhoff testified the proposal would unnecessarily destroy
shallow water fish habitat which provides for breeding, nursery and feeding. He testified that under the
St. Clair River remedial action plan, upon which he serves on the habitat subcommittee, loss of shallow
water habitat is a matter of critical concern. He indicated the project as proposed would involve a
permanent loss of 200 to 250 square feet of bottomland. Further, he stated that in his capacity with the
Department, he has rarely seen a request to fill as far out in the water as the Petitioner's proposal.
Through stipulation of the Parties, the Petitioner presented the testimony, by telephone, of Mr. Fred
Gottschalk, the Department's Contested Case Supervisor for Northern Michigan. Mr. Gottschalk, a
fisheries biologist by training, visited the site during the review process. He testified he did not
perceive any restriction of recreational use by the public, or any direct impairment of fishing by
Petitioner's proposal. He also did not foresee any impact on agriculture, commerce or industry and
termed the effects on wildlife and aesthetics as minimal. However, Mr. Gottschalk did not specifically
address Mr. Kolhoff's testimony regarding the permit application. Mr. Gottschalk further stated his
review was limited to the Ferguson site and he did not have the benefit of reviewing the entire file.
However, Mr. Gottschalk stated he was familiar with the terms of the modified permit and felt it was a
feasible and prudent alternative to the Petitioner's proposal.
Part 301 Analysis
Section 30105(6) of Part 301 provides in part:
The department, by rule promulgated pursuant to section 30110(1) may establish minor project
categories of activities and projects that are similar in nature and have minimal adverse impact.
The Department has, by rule, established minor project categories. 1985 AACS, R 281.816. As
previously indicated, neither party contests the fact that this project comes within a minor project
category as defined by the Rule. By definition, the project as proposed by the Petitioners has minimal
adverse environmental impact. However, a permit will not automatically issue if the project is so
classified. Rather, a minor project category proposal is merely exempt from the general notice
provisions of Part 301 and a public hearing is not required, butall other provisions of this part shall
be applicable to a minor project. Section 30105(6).
Section 30106 of Part 301 provides the prerequisites to issuing a permit:
The department shall issue a permit if it finds that the structure or project will not adversely affect the
public trust or riparian rights.
Under 1985 AACS, R 281.811(g), the term public trust means all of the following:
(i) The paramount right of the public to navigate and fish in all inland lakes and streams which are navigable.
(ii) The perpetual duty of the state to preserve and protect the public's right to so navigate and fish.
(iii) The paramount concern of the public and the protection of the air, water, and other natural
resources of this state against pollution, impairment, and destruction.
While the Petitioner does not dispute the St. Clair River is impressed with the public trust, he properly
argues that under the holing in Illinois Central Railroad Company v. Illinois, 146 US 387, 13 S Ct 110
(1892), there must be a substantial impact to the public trust to deny a permit.
Mr. Kolhoff testified that he considered the loss of shallow water habitat as negatively impacting the
public trust. This testimony, at best, demonstrates an indirect and insubstantial impact on fishing. I
find, as a Matter of Fact, approving the permit application will not adversely affect the public trust.
There was little, if any, testimony regarding the project's impact on riparian rights. Mr. Ferguson
testified he is the only riparian who uses the immediate area in front of his property. I find, as a Matter
of Fact, the activity proposed in the permit application would pose a negligible impact on riparian
rights.
While the Department's position on protecting the public trust or riparian rights under the standards
contained in Part 301 may be misplaced, it does recognize the "possible effects of the proposed action
upon the inland lake or stream and upon the waters from which or into which its waters flow and the
uses for all such waters... ."
Specifically, Part 301 under Section 30106 also requires:
In passing upon an application the department shall consider the possible effects of the proposed
action upon the inland lake or stream and upon the waters from which or into which its waters flow and
the uses of all such waters, including uses for recreation, fish and wildlife, aesthetics, local government,
agriculture, commerce and industry.
Other than the concerns for loss of shallow water habitat, the only evidence proffered as to the effect of
the proposed project on the St. Clair River, or the waters flowing into or from it, was Mr. Kolhoff's
testimony that it may possibly increase turbidity by trapping sediment. I find, as a Matter of Fact, this
concern is speculative and any such impact would not materially effect a body of water of the nature of
the St. Clair River.
The testimony indicates that the St. Clair River is used for recreational purposes. Although Mr.
Kolhoff stated he considered fishing as recreation, there is no testimony that recreation on the River
would be otherwise effected by the proposed sea wall, or the alternative proposed by the Department.
Therefore, I find, as a Matter of Fact, recreational use of the St. Clair River would not be effected by the
location of the sea wall as proposed by either the Petitioner or the Department.
There was testimony that the River is used for fishing. Mr. Kolhoff testified if Petitioner's proposal is
granted, fill would be placed in what is now open water, to the extent of 200 to 250 square feet. Such a
level of fill would permanently displace shallow water fish habitat. Conversely, the modified permit
proposal would substantially reduce the loss of open water, and I so find, as a Matter of Fact.
There was no testimony as to any wildlife impacts and there would appear to be none.
I conclude, as a Matter of Law, aesthetics refers to the water itself and not the Petitioner's property. I
find, as a Matter of Fact, the aesthetic impact on the water would be better served by the Department's
proposal to follow the shoreline.
The Petitioner proffered a letter from Scott A. Richards, Engineer/Director Community Development
for the City of Marysville regarding the City's position on the Petitioner's proposal. Exhibit P-3. Mr.
Richards stated that in his official capacity, he has no objection to the Petitioner's proposal.
Additionally, in his opinion the proposal does not adversely affect the public trust or riparian rights.
However, these statements do not address the specific criterion of the city's actual use of the water
itself, which is the proper consideration under Part 301. There was no testimony the proposal would
have any effect on the use of the water by a local government or an agricultural concern as the criteria is
utilized in Part 301.
There was no testimony regarding the effect on commercial use of the waters of the St. Clair River.
Mr. Ferguson testified that a sea wall as proposed by the Department might prevent him from building
on the property and, therefore, adversely affect market value. I conclude, as a Matter of Law, that as the
term commerce is used in Part 301, it refers to such uses occurring on the water, and not the economic
value of the Petitioner's real property.
The final water use which must be considered is industry. There was no evidence presented regarding
any industrial use of the waters of the St. Clair River and its relation to the proposed activity.
Lastly, section 30106 prohibits the Department from issuing a permit "...if the proposed project or
structure will unlawfully impair or destroy any of the waters or other natural resources of the state." To
implement this part of section 30106, the Department promulgated 1985 AACS, R 281.814 (Rule 4),
which states:
In each application for a permit, all existing and potential adverse environmental effects shall be
determined and a permit shall not be issued unless the department determines all of the following:
(a) That the adverse effects to the environment and the public trust are minimal and will be mitigated to the extent possible.
(b) That the resource affected is not a rare resource.
(c) That the public interest in the proposed development is greater than the public interest in the unavoidable degradation of the resource.
(d) That no feasible and prudent alternative is available.
The Petitioner argues that based on the Proposal for Decision in the Petition of Joseph Milani, Jr., File
No. 86-12-257, Rule 4 does not apply to this case. However, the Milani decision was based on a
finding that there would be no environmental harm from the project. In the instant case, while the
environmental harm is determined to be minimal in that the project qualifies as a minor project
category, all other provisions, including Rule 4 are applicable.
Subsection (a) of Rule 4 requires that adverse effects of the proposed project to the public trust be
minimal and mitigated to the extent possible. As previously discussed, there is no evidence that the
Petitioner's proposal will result in a substantial impact to the public trust. Furthermore, the
environmental impact of a "minor project" is minimal by definition. However, this rule requires even a
minimal impact be mitigated to the extent possible. Because much more shallow water habitat would
be eliminated by the Petitioner's proposal, as compared to the Department's proposal, the proposal as
applied for would cause a greater amount of damage to the environment. Mr. Kolhoff testified to the
concern of cumulative impacts on shallow water habitat and that he considered the remaining habitat to
be a rare resource. I find, as a Matter of Fact, the Petitioner's proposal does not mitigate the adverse
impact to the extent possible.
Subsection (b) requires that the resource affected is not a rare resource. As indicated above, Mr.
Kolhoff testified that he considers the shallow water habitat to be a rare resource. However, the resource
at issue in this case is the St. Clair River, not merely the river's shallow water habitat. In that there was
no evidence which indicates the St. Clair River is a rare resource, I find, as a Matter of Fact, the
resource affected is not rare.
Subsection (c) requires the public interest in the proposed development be greater that the unavoidable
degradation of the resource. The public interest in the proposed sea wall is extremely small, while the
public interest in the protection of shallow water habitat is relatively great. The degradation caused to
the shallow water resource by the Petitioner's proposal would be avoided with the Department's
proposal. Therefore, I find, as a Matter of Fact, the Department's proposal limits the degradation of the
resource, while at the same time it achieves the stated purpose of the Petitioner, protecting the property
from erosion and filling the immediate area damaged by erosion.
Subsection (d) requires that no feasible and prudent alternative is available to the proposal. As
discussed above, of the two proposals, the Department's is less disruptive to the environment, it is
feasible to construct and it would protect Petitioner's property from further erosion. Therefore, I find, as
a Matter of Fact, the Department's proposal is a feasible and prudent alternative to the Petitioner's
proposal.
PETITIONER'S LEGAL ARGUMENTS
The Petitioner asserted during the hearing that Mr. Kolhoff's utilization of the Project Review Report
is, in effect, formulating an unpromulgated rule. The Project Review Report is routinely used in every
field review of an application for a permit and is merely a form utilized by the field staff to memorialize
their observations. Most importantly, the form sets forth the criteria of the applicable statute, and in and
of itself does not establish any additional review criteria or categories.
In addition, in the Petitioner's Closing Statement and Arguments, it is argued that Mr. Kolhoff's
utilization of the ordinary high water mark to determine placement of the sea wall is, similarly, in
effect, utilizing an unpromulgated rule. Mr. Kolhoff's testimony as to the ordinary high water mark,
especially as elicited on redirect examination, indicates it was used to address the Department's
jurisdiction under Part 301. Specifically, it is pertinent in this regard because only activity below the
ordinary high water mark is regulated. The fact that he suggested the sea wall follow the existing
shoreline may or may not coincide with the established ordinary high water mark. Mr. Kolhoff testified
the modified permit was intended to balance the interests of the public and the resource pursuant to the
mandate of Part 301. From balancing these interests, he determined the Petitioner's needs would be
met, and the degradation to the resource minimized, if the sea wall essentially followed the existing
shoreline, irrespective of whether it followed the ordinary high water mark.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1. The St. Clair River is specifically referred to in section 30101(e) and is, therefore, by definition, an
inland lake subject to regulation under Part 301 of NREPA.
2. The Petitioner's proposed sea wall affects the bottomlands of the St. Clair River because the activity
is proposed to occur below the ordinary high water mark of the river.
3. The St. Clair River is a navigable body of water and is impressed with the public trust.
4. The Petitioner's proposed sea wall will not substantially impact the public trust.
5. The Petitioner's proposed sea wall has minimal environmental impact as defined in Part 301 because
it is a "minor project category" proposal.
6. The uses listed in Section 30106 of Part 301 refer to uses of the water and not to uses of the real
property adjacent to the water.
7. The Petitioner's proposed sea wall will not effect the use of the waters of the St. Clair River.
8. Pursuant to Rule 4(d), there is a feasible and prudent alternative to the Petitioner's proposed sea wall.
The feasible and prudent alternative is a sea wall which follows the existing shoreline.
PROPOSAL FOR DECISION
Based upon the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is proposed the Petitioner be issued a
permit for a sea wall as described in the Modified Permit entered as Exhibit R-7.
May 1, 1998 _________________________________ Richard A. Patterson
Administrative Law Judge
EXHIBIT LIST
PETITIONER
P-1 Application for Permit
P-2 Letter from City of Marysville re: zoning set backs
P-3 Letter from City of Marysville re: proposed sea wall
P-4 Letter from adjoining neighbor
P-4a Color photograph
P-5 Letter from adjoining neighbor
P-6 Drawing depicting home and set back lines
P-7 Black and white aerial photograph
P-8 Blue print aerial photograph taken 1986 or after
P-9 Photograph of waterfront
P-10 Two photographs of waterfront
P-11a Two photographs of waterfront
P-11b Two photographs of waterfront
P-12a Two photographs of waterfront
P-12b Two photographs of waterfront
P-12c Two photographs of waterfront
P-12d Two photographs of waterfront
P-13a Photographs of other sea walls in area
P-13b Photographs of other sea walls in area
P-13c Photograph of other sea wall in area
RESPONDENT
R-1 Application for Permit
R-2 Photograph of waterfront with lines depicting proposal and Department alternative.
RESPONDENT Exhibit List Continued
R-2b Photographs
R-3 Aerial photograph May 6, 1984
R-4 Close up of aerial photograph
R-5 Project Review Report
R-6 Listing of St. Clair River bulkhead applications
R-7 Letter enclosing modified permit and modified permit
R-8 Letter from U.S. Army Corps of Engineers May 5, 1997
R-9 Telecopy communication May 28, 1997